JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10117

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-23

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER

DATE : 00/00/1975
PAGES : 103

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/21/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 453

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10117
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-23

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER
DATE : 00/00/75
PAGES : 103
SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 453

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER

453-2

GOODWIN TESTIMONY NOTEBOOK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

July 17, 1975

To: F.A.O. Schwarz/Curtis Smothers

From: Joseph E. DiGenova

Re: Richard Goodwin Materials and Summary

Summary

A. Goodwin Interview of July 16, 1975

Mr. Goodwin was interviewed for a second time on July 16, 1975. He indicated that he chaired the "Cuba Task Force" after the Bay of Pigs. Paul Nitze had previously chaired the group. It was this Cuba Task Force that suggested the establishment of the Lansdale project. In this regard, Goodwin noted that Lansdale proved to be very efficient. Goodwin indicated that he was present during the conversation between President Kennedy and Tad Szulc concerning the question of assassinating Castro. (See Szulc's testimony *infra*.) He spoke with the President after that conversation and remembers JFK saying about assassination: "We can't get into that -- we'll all be targets." He noted that Bissell never mentioned anything to him, Goodwin, about assassination attempts. With regard to the August 10, 1962, meeting which he attended, Goodwin

noted that McCone never made any oration upon the immorality of assassinating Castro. He remembered the August 10 meeting and said that "assassination was not shot down". When pressed for details at this point, and after being shown the Lansdale (8/13/62) and Harvey (8/14/62) memoranda, he said he wanted to think about the meeting before he made any more statements about who said and did what. He noted, however, that in 1966 while in Peru with Robert Kennedy that Kennedy, in a fleeting retort to a series of questions about U. S. assassination attempts against Castro, said "Tell him (the interpreter) I saved his (Castro's) life."

At the conclusion of the interview he turned over to the Committee various documents related to Cuba which he had found in his personal papers. Those are appended to this summary.

B. Goodwin Interview of May 27, 1975

During the course of this earlier interview, Goodwin alluded to the Cuba Task Force. According to the Committee notes of that interview, the discussion went as follows:

> In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of assassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of

> assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force, held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro", someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant "Executive Action". McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later in the meeting after McNamara left. (See interview <u>infra</u>.)

C. <u>The Goodwin Documents</u>

The documents which Mr. Goodwin has furnished the Committee are of no startling significance. One document, the May 2, 1961, memorandum from Bissell to Goodwin, is noteworthy because it does not advise him of the Roselli connection or the efforts to assassinate Castro. Bissell notes, "I have not attempted to provide you with much detail." A May 24, 1961, Memorandum of Conversation with Bissell by Goodwin does not mention any reference by Bissell to actions against Castro on the assassination front. An Arthur Schlesinger memorandum of June 30, 1961, to the President discusses the need for revamping of the "intelligence set-up" of the United States. In a footnote in that memorandum, Schlesinger notes that the CIA is not able to control its operatives once they are in the field and of the attendant dangers this poses. (See page 6 of the memo.)

The other documents indicate the thinking that went on up to the point where the Lansdale group was established as the coordinated effort against Cuba.

Areas of Inquiry for Goodwin

-- What, if anything, does Goodwin remember of the August 10, 1962, meeting of the Special Group which he attended?

-- Is this meeting different than the meeting he refers to in his initial interview where McNamara broached the subject of assassinating Castro? Or has he simply confused them and are they one and the same?

-- How does he explain McCone's recollection of having given an oration on the immorality of assassinating Castro when it was brought up at the August 10 meeting?

-- Was McNamara the person who brought up the subject at that meeting?

-- What discussion, if any, followed?

SECRET

Draft
4/26/61

MEMORANDUM

To: McGeorge Bundy
From: Dick Goodwin

Here are a few scattered thoughts on the "Cuba" problem.

Cuba is a threat to the security of the United States in two basic ways:

1. As a direct military menace in the Caribbean, a menace which will be intensified as communist arms shipments continue. However, even this increased danger will be minimal. Our treaty obligations commit us to the defense of any American nation which is attacked directly. Any military moves by Castro could be met immediately by our forces. Similarly we could intervene in case of Castro military aid to guerilla operations in the Americas.

2. As an exporter of revolution: There is no doubt that Cuba is being used as a base for export of the communist-fidelista revolution. This is done through the actual supply of funds and technical assistance to insurgent elements, through widespread and reasonably effective propaganda apparatus including a news service and radio network and through the use of Cuba as an example of the alliance between fidelismo and necessary social reform -- identification with the welfare of the people.

This threat is significant -- especially in the Carribean area. However, even here, in the last six months there has been a significant decline in Cuban effectiveness. This has come because of the growing isolation of communist-- fiedlista elements from the Democratic left as Castro's pro-Soviet bent has

become more apparent; and as Castro has become increasingly erratic in his personal behavior. There are signs, in fact, that, the communists are looking for another, more stable, hero -- perhaps Cardenas of Mexico.

3. While this means a declining influence of fidelismo over popular movements; it does not necessarily lessen the importance of Cuban-Soviet-Chinese material and technical aid to revolutionary movements. It is important to remember that even if Castro were wiped out tomorrow we would not have solved the problem of communist influence in the Americas. In fact, most of the greatest danger spots (E.G. Northeast Brasil, Columbia back-country, communist dominated student movements, etc.) do not owe either their existence or strength to Castro, but to local and independent leadership. This danger has been steadily growing, and would continue to grow if our only anti-communist move were to knock out Castro. These movements will benefit from material assistance, even if they do not look to Cuba for leadership.

Suggested Course of Action:

Action Aimed At Cuba Directly

1. Before acting directly against Castro, in any fashion, we need a complete reassessment of the vulnerability of his regime -- the degree of popular support, the probably declining position of the Cuban economy and its impact on the Cuban people, the efficiency of his police state, the possibilities of underground organization, etc. Without such an assessment it is

impossible to realistically determine what alternative courses of action are open to us.

2. To meet the military threat we can work out defense agreements with Central American nations along the lines suggested with Professor Berle.

3. We should approach the government of Chile to call an Inter-American arms limitation conference. This conference should deal with methods of stopping external arms shipments in the context of the over-all limitations which are desparately needed in Latin America. We should decide, before this meeting, whether the risks in an OAS blockade of arms shipments to Cuba are outweighed by the dangers involved in halting and searching international shipping.

4. Immediately consult with heads of major nations in Latin America to see how far they are willing to go in terms of collective action. This should be done via a personal emissary. Although we should have a reasonably clear idea of what we want to do, this should be a genuine consultation among allies. All the myriad proposals for OAS action, etc., depend on the reaction of other Latin nations -- a reaction as yet undetermined.

5. Underlying all these proposals is the feeling that we should not move quickly in direct action against Cuba. I do not believe that there is any course of direct action which we can wisely take on the basis of current knowledge and conditions.

Attempts to stop direct export of Castroism

1. We should provide Carribean nations with the technical help (e.g. radar to spot incoming planes) and navy patrol assistance to meet the dangers of arms shipments from Cuba to insurgent elements in those nations.

2. There are two or three real danger spots (E.g. Dominican Republic and Haiti) where we should now be developing democratic alternatives to the present regime -- organizing replacement governments. If we do not do this then the inevitable changes in government may be followed by Castro-type regimes. When Democratic alternatives are organized we should consider means of precipitating the fall of Trujillo and Duvalier and possibly Somoza. In this way we can exert maximum control over the type of replacement government -- the timing and initiative should be ours.

3. Help provide counter-propaganda assistance to Latin governments -- e.g. radio transmitters. The more we can work through Democratic-liberal forces in Latin America, rather than through USIA alone, the more effective will be our propaganda.

General counter-communist operations

Our long-range strategy in the Americas should have two basic elements: First, the organization of a strong political counter-force. We have a ready instrument in the newly organized League of Democratic parties.

We should assist these parties -- financially and technically -- to develop progressive political movements (in some cases revolutionary movements, especially in the less progressive countries) through helping them in techniques of organization down to the village level, ideological warfare, etc. U. S. government help should be covert.

Second, the Alianza para el progreso. This program with its emphasis on social and economic advance is the real hope of preventing a communist takeover. The Alianza is proceeding about as rapidly as possible given present organization of effort, and the magnitude of available funds. Both of these elements are unsatisfactory.

A. Funds: Present plans provide for the allocation of 250-350 million dollars worth of economic assistance to Latin America in fiscal 1962. This is out of a total of 2.4. billion. (This sum does not include the social development fund). One hundred million of this will go to Brazil to get them over their current financial crisis. I am not clear that any substantial allocation could be made given the enormous needs in Asia (especially in India and Pakistan) -- although I believe there can be some increase. However, these funds are probably not sufficient to make a real and effective start in economic development.

B. Organization: If communist takeover comes in Latin America it probably will not come through guerilla warfare, but through the capture of

indigenous revolutionary movements. We cannot meet such a threat effectively -- well-organized as it is -- when our overseas operations are as diffuse and uncoordinated as they are today. The aid program, the political bureaus of State, the USIA, educational exchange, CIA activities all go, to too great an extent, their own way under separate heads and often in pursuit of separate goals. I believe that resulting diffusion of effort, results in great waste of resources and intelligence. We must organize our non-military overseas operation to reflect our basic objective in Latin America -- the strengthening of democratic Western-oriented nations and governments so that they have the capacity to resist communist attack in all its forms. Those who are charged with the responsiblity for achieving this objective must have control over the instruments which our government provides. Just as we have seen the need for some centralization of command in fighting hot wars -- it is needed for effectively waging a cold war. This does not necessarily mean a "Chief of Hemisphere Operations"; but at the very least it means that, within each key country there must be a central operational capacity and authority with direct lines to the levels of action in Washington.

EYES ONLY

2 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard N. Goodwin
Assistant Special Counsel to the President

SUBJECT: Possible Covert Activities against Cuba

Attached is a brief statement regarding covert operations against Cuba. In view of your familiarity with this subject and our conversations over the past few days, I have not attempted to provide you with much detail.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Attachment: Paper as stated above

EYES ONLY

SECRET

2 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard N. Goodwin
Assistant Special Counsel to the President

SUBJECT: Possible Covert Activities against Cuba

Attached is a brief statement regarding covert operations against Cuba. In view of your familiarity with this subject and our conversations over the past few days, I have not attempted to provide you with much detail.

(Signed) Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Attachment: Paper as stated above

SECRET

EYES ONLY

2 May 1961

As indicated by the combined INR/ONE estimate, anti-Castro activity within Cuba will probably be muted at least for the next several months. Most individuals whose loyalty is in any way suspect have been arrested. A recent report from the Swiss Ambassador indicated that political prisoners now number 100,000. All internal services will continue to work on a theory of repression plus undoubtedly swift and brutal penalties. Consequently, it will be very difficult to carry on any clandestine operations and it is doubtful that such operations can have any significant impact in weakening the Castro regime.

In spite of this, evidence is still available that there is opposition to the regime among individuals still at large and that such opposition is prepared to undertake action despite the risks involved. Moreover, there are still agents distributed through most of the six provinces and communications can still be had either directly or indirectly with these individuals. At the very least these agents can and will continue to collect information and to transmit it to the Agency. In addition, certain of these individuals, plus some additional ones who might be infiltrated, could attempt to carry out some sabotage. Individual acts of sabotage are possible with relatively few men and small amounts of material. Successive acts of sabotage or extensive

SECRET

sabotage operations are more difficult and inevitably more costly in terms of loss of men. Nevertheless, it would be possible, starting in the near future, to attempt limited sabotage with a view to determining its feasibility and with the hope that gradually an increased program might be developed.

A capability also exists for types of maritime operations including infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, landing and caching of arms, under-water sabotage of shipping and small raider operations. Under present circumstances it would seem wrong to attempt these except on a very limited scale and, in all likelihood, raider operations should not be attempted until more information regarding feasibility has been obtained.

The Agency also has a small air arm including some transport aircraft (C-54 and C-46 types) plus attack bomber aircraft (B-26). Although it is not absolutely certain, there is reason to suppose that Cuban crews also are available for operational flights. At the moment, air operations should be substantially eliminated with the possible exception of supply flights to support opposition elements unable to survive without such support. Even with respect to such operations, however, it should be remembered that the percentage of successful night drops is extremely limited so that the urgency should be great to justify the risk. B-26 strikes could, of course, be flown against chosen targets (e.g. refineries, power plants, tire plants) and, if

successful, might have the effect of extensive sabotage. In view of the risks involved, however, and the poor deniability of U.S. support where aircraft are involved, it is recommended that such operations be avoided at least for the present.

Manolo Ray of the MRP has asserted an independent MRP capability to conduct infiltration, intelligence collection, sabotage and defection operations into Cuba. He recognizes a need for U.S. support but is very firm in his desire to operate as independently as possible of any official U.S. connection. His initial request is for five boats, some materiel and some money. He admits, however, that, looking ahead, additional support such as real estate, some help with training and communications will be required. He offers to share his information with the U.S. Government, seek U.S. advice and, at least for a period of time, be willing to operate with the Revolutionary Council. The Council's views are being canvassed and Ray has been asked to prepare a prospectus giving in some detail his needs for U.S. support for the immediate future and the step-up required over a period of time should his efforts prove successful.

The Ray proposal should certainly be examined and given support within reasonable limits if the relationships proposed both with the Council and with the U.S. are satisfactory.

In addition to the activities described above, propaganda activities such as radio broadcasts and publication of magazines and newspapers can be continued independently by the Agency or in support of Ray or the Revolutionary Council. Moreover, limited political action operations are possible. As to both propaganda and political action, however, the amount of effort and the type of activity undertaken will depend to a large extent on the decisions with respect to the operations described above. Consequently, these will be noted here as mere possibilities.

3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(NSC Action No. 2413-c; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961)

a. Agreed that the political objective of U. S. policy toward Cuba is to bring about the downfall of the Castro regime.

b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military intervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future.

c. Agreed that the Cuban situation should be kept under constant review, in the light of the possibility that actions by Castro would prompt a reconsideration of the decision not to intervene.

d. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval or air blockade against Cuba at this time.

e. Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, especially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assistance, taking into account the possibility of U. S. intervention at a future [redacted] date.

f. Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regime.

[illegible]

g. Noted the President's direction that the Task Force on Cuba make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today.

h. ~~Noted that a Special Committee, under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence, would prepare a plan of special covert operations with respect to Cuba, for the consideration of the President.~~

i. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S. armed forces and trained ~~in special units consisting of Spanish-speaking nationals~~, under a plan to be presented by the Secretary of Defense in connection with his review of U. S. conventional forces.

j. Agreed that Cuban nationals now in the United States will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, in carrying on their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas. Cuban nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status.

k. Agreed not to impose a complete trade embargo on Cuba for the present, but if later actions by Castro resulted in a decision to do so, all trade with Cuba would be stopped. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of how a U. S. embargo on trade with Cuba would affect our trade relations with other countries under the Battle Act.

l. Noted that the President would discuss with Canada the position of Canadian subsidiaries of U. S. corporations in the event of U. S. impositions in trade embargoes on Cuba.

m. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements to quarantine Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling

DRAFT

subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of international communism by [redacted] all nations of this hemisphere.

n. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social development projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social development, including consideration of a supplemental appropriation for development loans.

o. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would [redacted] expand its existing program in Latin America rather than initiate electronic warfare against the Castro regime.

p. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under genedal guidance to be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers.

TOP SECRET

DRAFT

g. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.

4. U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral.

Barry Dearborn back for a day or two

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 50

DRAFT RECORD OF ACTIONS
483rd NSC Meeting
(5/5/61)

1. U. S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19.

2. U. S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA

Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs should be established to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19.

3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(NSC Action No. 2413-c; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961)

a. Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action.

b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military intervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future.

3. U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

c. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, especially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet bloc military assistance, so that U. S. capabilities for possible intervention may be maintained at an adequate level.

e. Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regime, and to possible political action to end the current terror.

f. Noted the President's direction that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today.

g. Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized as a government-in-exile, support should be given to it insofar as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment.

h. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S. armed forces under plans to be developed by the Secretary of Defense.

3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

i. Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U. S. visitors' visas will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in carrying on their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas. Cuban nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status. All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizenship.

j. Agreed not to impose an immediate trade embargo on Cuba. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of the effects of a U. S. embargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is imposed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain exceptions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution of drugs.

k. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of international communism by all nations of this hemisphere.

3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

l. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social development projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social development, including consideration of a supplemental appropriation for development loans of the order of $200-$400 million.

m. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would expand its existing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare against the Castro regime; means of propaganda should be made available to non-U. S. groups.

n. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under general guidance to be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers.

o. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.

p. Agreed that pending appointment of an Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President.

4. U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral.

5. U. S. POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would consider what can be done in cooperation with the British to forestall a communist take-over in that country.

6. U. S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

a. Noted that efforts should be made to reassure Sarit and Diem that we are not abandoning Southeast Asia.

b. Noted the President's view that Sarit could be told that we are considering inclusion of U. S. troops in SEATO forces to be stationed in Thailand, the timing to be dependent on developments during or after the forthcoming 14-nation Geneva Conference.

c. Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would be sending recommendations to the President promptly on the number of U. S. training troops to be stationed in Thailand.

May 24, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH:

Dick Bissell
Tracy Barnes

Mr. Bissell agreed that no major decisions concerning covert activities in Cuba should be made before the President returns from his European trip. However there are a few things he thought should be done immediately:

1. That he revise the internal CIA organization in preparation for possible covert activities. This means changes bothehere and in Miami.

2. That a small group (30 to 40) Cuban pilots be continued as pilots under commercial cover in Central America and perhpps one or two American companies. No commitment should be made to them that they would be used in future activities. They would be trained as individuals and not as any group or "movement." This is primarily to keep their skills alive and to keep them available.

3. He wishes to clean up the Nicaraguan situation. We have left a lot of Military hardware there as a residue of the Cuban operation. He would like to pull this equipment out of there, turning some of the B 26's over to Somoza and allowing some of the Cuban pilots to remain there to train Nicaraguans in flying these planes. This would be at Somoza's request and would only be done if he insisted upon it as a re-payment for services rendered. I stressed that no Americans should be involved in the training of Nicaraguan pilots.

4. He would like to train a few Cubans as radio operators. They would be trained as individuals and would not know each other or that any others were being trained. This amounts to training some individual agents for possible future use. No commitments would be made to any of the men trained. It is felt that this much activity is necessary in the next few weeks.

5. In addition, the Agency would like to survey the various potential insurrectionary groups which now exist. There are several of these groups, three or four of which claim to have an underground in Cuba. We should speak to them. We should tell them we could make absolutely no commitment as to any future activities. However, he would like from them an assesment of what they thought they could do in the future and -- if they were to be active -- what help they would require from the United States.

TOP SECRET

This would enable us to make a judgment as to whether we should engage in covert activity based partly upon this information -- information which would tell us what help in specific terms would be required and what we could expect from these groups. This has already been done in the case of Mirona Ray. The groups contacted would include the Council, the MRP, UNIDAD and MRR.

6. In addition, he was informed that Swan radio could not be used by the USIA. They are unable to assimilate it into their system. I suggested that we might try to find a good Latin American group, e.g., The League of Democratic Parties or the Institute of Political Education run by Jose Figures, to use it. I said that for the Council to operate the station did not seem to me to be desirable.

7. I discussed the general situation in Miami and the various newspaper reports. I pointed out that the CIA agents now in Miami were known to everyone, including the press, and were the same people who were identified with pre-invasion activities. Their presence I felt only intensified the rivalry among Cuban groups and served as a focal point of discontent. I requested that this group be broken up and that to the extent agents were necessary new people -- people not identified with the pre-invasion activities -- should be sent to Miami.

8. It was agreed that no future covert activities should be conducted in the Miami area and that the groups with whom we dealt should be scattered in other cities throughout the Southeastern part of the country. I said that working in Miami was like trying to carry on covert activities in the city room of a newspaper.

9. We also agreed that Dr. Miro could be informed that we were making a survey of other Cuban groups but that he should be told nothing more specific than that.

10. I also referred to the newspaper stories which reported that Batistianos were being used supported by U.S.-CIA funds. They said this was not accurate. They said that this would be very carefully looked into and that the most specific instructions would be given that absolutely no Batistianos should be supported directly or indirectly by the U.S. government.

11. I am strongly of the opinion that we must clear up the Miami area as soon as possible. Therefore, I will get Ribicoff to expedite the Refugee program, probably through the use of Mutual Security funds in order to get these people into jobs, schools, etc. in other parts of the country. Unless we do this we are going to have continually increasing problems in the Miami area.

Richard N. Goodwin

SECRET

June 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization

I submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown*; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible errors. The important thing to recognize today, in my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present staffed and constituted, has about used up its quota. Its margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganized, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate; and that this autonomy is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate

---

*Or should be -- a grave and repeated CIA failing has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (e.g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 13, 1954).

conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these problems can perhaps be alleviated.

I. CIA Autonomy

CIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intelligence collection; covert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries on those functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the autonomy are historical.

When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of its personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous protection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large number of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.

By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State retained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation almost as a fait accompli; State never had title to control overt clandestine intelligence collection; and it had lost ground in such areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of overt diplomatic contacts.

For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paralleling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign service; it has (or has had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air force. Its annual budget is about __ times that of the State Department. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a state.

II. Doctrine

Though CIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.

It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such, we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in conspiracy; and the whole point of Communist social and political organization is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity. Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and understood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?

We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and make speeches, reporters will dig out stories, newspapers will publish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA must operate. In short, they constitute the problem; and, as General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the problem."

There follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.

Each form of secret activity presents its own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. Its rules and usages are fairly well established. In the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook and a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other activities of the government.

Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidize newspapers, politicians and organizations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the size of the proposed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society, the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming case be made for its necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms; we must ask whether its success requires our open society to be in any serious way false to its own principles.

III. Operations and Policy

Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NSA operation).

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations. Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (e.g., the information derived from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (e.g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador.

2. Covert political operations technically require State Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of a rubber stamp.

This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organizing coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal; they probably feel that they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organize as many coups as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' has legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency planning,' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contingencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and alienation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many problems and embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must thereafter do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agents.*

---

*We become prisoners of our agents in another sense too. The Cuban episode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control its own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are men of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are sometimes tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their own and not necessarily in political or even moral sympathy with the purposes of the operation. Such actions as locking up the Revolutionary Council, such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportedly trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes as the detention and third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa and 16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things go on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only dimly acquainted.

It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have favored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off." Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism, State, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.

3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover

(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." Nonetheless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA people. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing <u>overt</u> internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA has even sought to monopolize contact with certain French political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of the Paris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and on

the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Gavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)

CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them: when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla succeeds when his program enlists grassroots support; and it is very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him. Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia: "we are sending 50,000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of overcoming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.

Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tito's defection closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. In the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, organization of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence. If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote Mao Tse-tung, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." He added, "Do we want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe."

For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a political weapon and must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight. It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than transferred to Defense.

5. How to Establish Policy Control? Here I wonder whether the British experience might not be of value. The notable feature of the British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine activity under strict Foreign Office control. This control is achieved in a number of ways:

a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well as the Chief of SIS.

b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental Working Group on International Communist Fronts, and under the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department in the Foreign Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only conform to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical desks.

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern operations in special areas, such as, for example, Sino-Soviet relations or the World Youth Festival.

e) a Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer sits next to the SIS Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve tours of duty in SIS sections.

All these devices might be adopted for use by the State Department. Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all points subject to State Department clearance -- a clearance to be

enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of working groups, and by the infiltration of State Department personnel into the intelligence agency.

Obviously this set-up would not succeed, however, unless the State Department itself were prepared to overcome its inbred habits of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and purposeful grip on the situation.

IV. Operations and Intelligence

The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particularly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two separable activities: clandestine collection; and research, analysis and evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelligence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that "a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by . . . overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy"); the second involves the collation and interpretation of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysis and estimating function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.

Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for both clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research also has research and analysis responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA has established control over the machinery for producing national estimates in such a way as to reduce State's contribution to submitting its views to CIA for acceptance or rejection. In other words, where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field, in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA.

The argument against incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty."

Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA -- i.e., if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then those committed to a particular operation will tend to select out the intelligence which validates the operation.

Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishment of a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&E group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is, that neither policy nor operations will be subjected to adequate intelligence checks.

The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The intelligence branch (DDI) of CIA was never informed of the existence of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent had reached the point in Cuba where a successful landing operation would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the Militia. In December and February, the Office of National Estimates produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these were wholly independent of the Cuban operation. I gather that, if its opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different estimate of the state of opinion in Cuba from that on which the operation was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation

that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA, was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State knew even less about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and searching scrutiny.

Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become subordinate to State, as MI-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the R&E function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat independent of both State and CIA, yet closely connected with both in day-to-day operations. The R&E subagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course, from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDI and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain of the service functions now confided to CIA -- photographic interpretation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collection, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairman.

V. Conclusion.

The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrangement of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department as at present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this is not, in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganization of intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department.

The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would be as follows:

1) The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.

2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include representatives from all elements in the intelligence community and also from the White House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Information Service). This new agency would be charged with responsibility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relationship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do.

4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordinate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would include CIA/DDI, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA (photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast monitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.). It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

cc: The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan

Cuba

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 8, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD GOODWIN

SUBJECT: Cuban Covert Plan

Analysis of this plan shows that it envisages (a) "an island-wide resistance organization responsive to Agency direction"; "internal assets under close Agency control and direction"; (b) "support and guidance to those anti-Castro groups who are revealed to have a potential for clandestine operations"; and (c) "primary operations bases" in the US. In short, what is intended is a CIA underground formed on criteria of operational convenience rather than a Cuban underground formed on criteria of building political strength sufficient to overthrow Castro.

Despite the pretense of political impartiality, the effect of these CIA specifications is obviously to favor those groups most willing to accept CIA identification and control, and to discriminate against those groups most eager to control their own operations. I. e., the plan discriminates in favor of mercenaries, reactionaries, etc., and discriminates against men of independence and principle. Thus these criteria eliminate the Manuel Ray group; yet I can find nowhere in the documents any explicit exclusion of pro-Batista people.

Leaving aside the moral merits of this discrimination, the practical effect is to invest our resources in the people least capable of generating broad support within Cuba. The Agency fails to confront the key problem: i. e., that those most capable of rallying popular support against the Castro regime are going to be more independent, more principled and perhaps even more radical than the compliant and manageable types which CIA would prefer for operational purposes.

My recommendation is that you stop this paper in its present form and demand that it be recast to make political sense. The key is the

statement that our covert activity "should be viewed only as the covert contribution to any national program designed to bring about the eventual replacement of the Castro government." This is correct; and there follows from it (a) that our covert activity should encourage the spread of the political sentiments within Cuba most likely to rally support for Castro's overthrow (which means, for example, Ray rather than Batista), and (b) that our covert activity should harmonize with our basic national policy of rescuing the Cuban Revolution, as set forth in the White Paper.

It is a fallacy to suppose that clandestine activity can be carried out in a political vacuum.

A. S. Jr.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

September 1, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Cuban Task Force met at the White House on Thursday, August 31. Present were Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Woodward, two members of the ARA Bureau, Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes and myself.

The following decisions were made:

1. We would proceed immediately to discuss with other Carribean governments the possibility of organizing a Carribean Security Force. This could be organized on the basis of informal understandings within the framework of existing treaty arrangements, as a series of new bilateral treaties, or a formal, multilateral treaty. It was thought that the basis of organization would depend on the judgment of other Carribean countries as to how they could accomplish the objective of establishing the force without running serious internal political risks. The United States, for its part, would prefer the formal multi-lateral arrangement. Such a Carribean Security Force would have at least four major aspects:

(1) Advance committment to come to the aid of other signatories threatened by Castro revolutions and, perhaps the designation of specific units for participation in necessary multi-lateral actions.

(2) The establishment of a pool of intelligence information concerning subversive activities with provision for exchange of such information.

(3) The establishment of a Carribean air and sea patrol to watch for suspected infiltration of Castro arms or agents.

(4) A training program in combatting subversive tactics, police organization and procedure, etc.

It was conceded that the substantive aspects of this arrangement could, if necessary, be achieved informally. However, the decision to seek a more formal arrangement was primarily arrived at on the basis of internal political considerations in the United States.

SECRET

2. It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba should be as quiet as possible -- trying to ignore Castro and his island.

3. Our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of targets important to the economy, e.g., refineries, plants using U.S. equipment, etc. This would be done within the general framework of covert operations -- which is based on the principle that para-military activities ought to be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for establishing an effective political opposition to Castro within Cuba. Within that principle we will do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose destruction will have the maximum economic impact.

4. We will intensify our surveillance of Cuban trade with other countries and especially U. S. subsidiaries in other countries; and then employ informal methods to attempt to divert this trade -- depriving Cuba of markets and sources of supply. I understand that we have already had a few successes in this effort.

5. We will establish next week -- in the State Department -- a psychological warfare group. This will be a full-time group of three or four people charged with the responsibility of assembling all available information on the Sovietization of Cuba, repression of human rights, failure of the Cuban economy, etc. -- much of which has been hitherto classified -- putting this information into readable, popularized form, and developing methods of disseminating it through Latin America. Such dissemination would be primarily through USIA channels but would include feeding it to Latin papers for "exclusive" stories, helping to prepare scripts for Latin American broadcasts, perhaps a direct mailing list of intellectuals and government officials to be handled by a front group, etc. The basic idea is to get this stuff into channels of Latin American communication, instead of treating it as official U. S. propaganda. We have selected someone to head this effort -- Jim O'Donnell of George Ball's office who was a free-lance magazine writer (including work for the Saturday Evening Post) for many years and who Ball highly recommends.

6. The CIA was asked to come up -- within the week -- with a precise, covert procedure for continuing the below-ground dialogue with the Cuban government. The object of this dialogue -- to explore the possibility of a split within the governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split -- was fully detailed in my last memorandum to you. This is an effort to find an operational technique.

Richard N. Goodwin

SECRET

November 1, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe that the concept of a "command operation" for Cuba, asdiscussed with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all-out attack on the Cuban problem. Since I understand you are favorably disposed toward the idea I will not discuss why the present disorganized and uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively.

The beauty of such an operation over the next few months is that we cannot lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro. If not, then at lease we will emerge with a stronger underground, better propaganda and a far clearer idea of the dimensions of the problems which affect us.

The question then is who should head this operation. I know of no one currently in Cuban affairs at the State Department who can do it. Nor is it a very good idea to get the State Department involved in depth in such covert activities. I do not think it should be centered in the CIA. Even if the CIA can find someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major problems will be to revamp CIA operations and thinking -- and this will be very hard to do from the inside.

I believe that the Attorney General would be the most effective commander of such an operation. Either I or someone else should be assigned to him as Deputy for this activity, since he obviously will not be able to devote full time to it. The one danger here is that he might become too closely identified with what might not be a successful operation. Indeed, chances of success are very speculative. There are a few answers to this:

(1) Everyone knowledgeable in these affairs -- in and out of government -- is aware that the United States is already helping the underground. The precise manner of aid may be unknown but the fact of aid is common knowledge. We will be blamed for not winning Cuba back whether or not we have a "command operation" and whether or not the Attorney General heads it.

(2) His role should be told to only a few people at the very top with most of the contact work in carrying out his decisions being left to his deputy. If that deputy is someone already closely identified with the conduct of Cuban affairs then it would appear as if normal channels are being followed except that decisive attention would be given to the decisions which came through those channels. There are probably three or four people who could fulfill this criterion.

This still leaves a substantial danger of identifying the Attorney General as the fellow in charge. This danger must be weighed against the increased effectiveness of an operation under his command.

Richard N. Goodwin

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

2 November 1961

MEMORANDUM

I believe that the operation should be organized with five staff components:

1. Intelligence collection and evaluation
2. Guerilla and underground
3. Propaganda
4. Economic warfare (exclusive of covert activities within Cuba)
5. Diplomatic relations

Each of these divisions would be headed by someone directly responsible to you. In addition you would have a deputy who would do the actual contact work between this operation and the various government agencies involved. He would be the one identified as the source of orders and directives when direct contact with the agencies was needed. [redacted] He should be from CIA for reasons discussed below. I would act as Staff Assistant to you. My primary job would be to see that current questions for decision were presented to you at your morning staff meetings with the alternatives fully discussed. I would have no direct operational duties; thus keeping in the back ground.

I have talked to MacNamara and he has promised to supply a topflight guerilla and underground man, as well as whatever additional personnel we need. I think this is the best way to handle it. However, it will be necessary to use the CIA apparatus and agents for this. That is why it will be valuable to assign a CIA man to you as deputy in order to keep them happy and [redacted] deeply involved at the command level. In this way we can probably avoid an internal struggle between the CIA field operatives and the Defense command.

Both the diplomatic relations and economic warfare people can come from State. I have some ideas on this and -- if you give the signal -- will discuss it with George Ball.

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

TOP SECRET

One of Bob Amory's brightest young men should be assigned to intelligence collection and evaluation.

As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence from the Times and work on this one -- although we should check with Ed Murrow and Dick Bissell.

These people should have a headquarters. It should probably be at the Pentagon because (a) we might get better security; (b) MacNamara will be easier to work with in terms of getting whatever staff services, secretarial personnel, etc; (c) It is a relatively neutral place between State and CIA; (d) you could re-arrange your schedule to stop in on the way to Justice every morning -- perhaps for a breakfast or post-breakfast meeting.

This operation should not be discussed at tomorrow's meeting. Initially only George Ball (and Rusk, of course), MacNamara, McCone and Bissell should know of your participation. When they are named, the five section heads will have to know -- ~~the~~ the initial organizing work and contact work should be done through your Deputy and myself. If this subject is discussed tomorrow then already too many people will know about it.

The first steps are (a) name the section chiefs (b) review with them all current operations in their field, establish their authority over operations, get nec-essary staff assistance (on as small as possible basis), and start them to work; (c) establish the physical headquarters; (d) arrange for financing -- presumably coming largely from CIA.

If this meets with your approval I will begin work on the above items with all final decisions on personnel and other matters subject, of course, to your approval.

Richard N. Goodwin

Copy

EYES ONLY

November 4, 1961

The following are some tentative recommendations meant to serve as a basis of discussion:

I would recommend that the Cuban operation be organized in five components:

a. Intelligence collection and evaluation
b. Underground and guerilla
c. Propaganda
d. Economic warfare (other than covert activities within Cuba)
e. Diplomatic relations

Although these sections will make use of available agency capabilities the operational authority for each of these aspects of the operation will be in the hands of the section leader who is responsible to the chairman of the group. All of these activities will be compartmentalized as much as possible, i.e., only the chairman will be kept completely informed on all aspects of the operation.

The operation should have its physical headquarters in the Department of Defense, both for maximum security and to detach it as much as possible from identification as a CIA activity.

The first steps are:

1. Designation of section chiefs;
2. A complete survey by each section chief of current operations in his field;
3. The establishment of control over operations by the section chief;
4. The expansion of operations where feasible.

Bob Amory should be asked to designate one of his best men to centralize the intelligence collection and evaluation.

The Defense Department should designate the section chief for underground and guerilla activities.

EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

We should discuss expansion of propaganda operations with Ed Murrow and appropriate CIA officers -- not relating it to stepped up operations in other fields. With these people we should select a single person to be the propaganda chief, coordinating CIA and USIA operations. I have suggested that Tad Szulc -- if he can be persuaded to take a leave of absence -- would be a useful person to advise on this aspect of the operation.

Both economic warfare and diplomatic relations should be handled by a designee of the State Department. It is important to keep the diplomatic relations aspect of this operation under some sort of control so that we don't involve ourselves in potentially embarrassing situations in the OAS, e.g. voting to send an investigating committee to Cuba when our operations are at a height and Fidel has evidence to present of U.S. participation.

The Deputy should be from CIA.

The President should not talk to the press. It may be that some contacts with a few key newsmen should be made -- in the most general way. But if the President approaches them personally and the operation does not succeed it is inevitable that he will become the focus of another Cuban failure. There are two types of newsmen involved here. There is a rather large group which will hear rumors and stories of various kind. There is nothing to be done about them. There are a few newsmen whose contacts in the Cuban community are so extensive that they might be able to put together a coherent story. If any approaches are to be made it should be restricted to these; although they should never be told we are going to wage an all-out operation. In addition, as much contact and operational work as possible should be done outside the Miami area.

Our next step should be to designate section chiefs, establish their authority and have them make a complete survey of present operations. This would include a survey of current covert operations and capacities here and in Miami (and anywhere else they are going on), as the first task of the Defense Department designee with CIA assistance. The physical headquarters should be established.

Although the Attorney General should maintain a general operational supervision, it is probably unwise for him to be the formal chairman of the group because the risk of identification is fairly high.

If such identification is made, and the operation is not successful, another Cuban failure may be directly traceable to the President. I regard this as fairly remote in this type of operation but the danger can be decreased if the operation is formally headed by someone who is not so clearly acting at the direct behest of the President. The Attorney General can give assistance and maintain general supervision on behalf of the President, working with the Chairman alone -- rather than extending his contacts to include all the operation chiefs.

November 22, 1961

Bob --

If you approve this (it is based on a brief memo from General Lansdale) I will send it on its way. In addition you should have a meeting -- as soon as possible -- with Lansdale and the senior representatives of State, Defense and CIA. If you want to call me on this after you have read the memo I will suggest a procedure for getting them together.

Richard N. Goodwin

TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY

November 22, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of CIA
The Attorney General
General Taylor
General Lansdale
Richard Goodwin

The following is a summary of the major decisions which have been made in regard to the Cuba Operation.

1. We will go ahead with the discussed project to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime and establish a free Cuba. All available assets will be directed to this end as a matter of urgent national priority.

2. The program will be conducted under the general guidance of the Attorney General, with General Lansdale as his chief of operations.

3. The program will be reviewed in two weeks in order to determine whether General Lansdale will continue as chief of operations.

4. The NSC 5412 group will be kept informed of activities.

5. The Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency will appoint senior officers of their department as personal representatives to assist the chief of operations as required. These senior officers should be able to exercise -- either themselves or through the Secretaries and Director -- effective operational control over all aspects of their Department's operations dealing with Cuba.

6. Knowledge of the existence of this operation should be restricted to the recipients of this memorandum, members of the 5412 group, and the representatives appointed by the Secretaries and the Director. Any further dissemination of this knowledge will be only with the authority of the Secretaries of State or Defense, the Attorney General, or the Chief of Operations.

TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY

HARVEY #5

[illegible] Ex. 18
7-1-75

MONGOOSE

10 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962

PRESENT: State: Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Hurwitch

White House: General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

Defense/JCS: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, General Lansdale

CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey

USIA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson

1. Mr. McCone said that the conclusion of the Board of National Estimates was that the Soviets will not let the Castro regime fail because of its own inherent weaknesses. This thought had not been contained as such in the NIE. Later in the meeting, Mr. McCone said that he believes we must face the fact that Cuba will be stronger in a year or two than it is now; he added his personal opinion that the Soviets might consider establishing an MRBM base in Cuba. He noted that these two points are not necessarily concurred in by the Board of National Estimates or by the USIB.

2. At Secretary Rusk's request, General Lansdale gave a brief explanation of the four possible courses of action outlined in recent papers. He then summarized progress to date by saying that during Phase I, now completed, an intensive intelligence look has been taken at Cuba, that we have learned a great deal, but that we do not yet have a true assessment of resistance potential.

3. Mr. Rusk suggested the possibility that in the event of a blockade of Berlin, the U.S. might wish to change its posture toward Cuba, perhaps engaging in direct retaliation against Soviet shipping, etc. He suggested that the Berlin and Cuba contingency plans should be closely meshed. Mr. McNamara was uncertain on this point, saying that he did not believe limited retaliation of this kind would constitute an adequate response to a Berlin blockade, whereas world-wide harrassment of Soviet facilities would be a different matter.

4. Mr. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between Castro and old-line Communists. He pointed out that such a split would be bound to be beneficial to U.S. interests no matter which way the balance of power swung. In this general connection, it was hard for him to visualize a valid pretext for U.S. military intervention in Cuba under any circumstances currently foreseen. However, should reasonably viable resistance develop to the extent for example that some provinces might oppose the Havana Government, then the U.S. might desire to give support to such provincial officials.

In response to the above, Mr. McCone pointed out that at the moment the previously-cited frictions between Castro and the old-line Communists have been resolved in Castro's favor, and no issue currently exists. There has additionally been at least a temporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow. He indicated that this of course may be temporary. He said that there has been some success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work for the U.S., and that there have been some defections.

5. The discussion then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program. Mr. McNamara questioned whether we cannot separate the building up of agent assets within Cuba from actions that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion. This led to the suggestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the over-all objective from one of overthrowing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible failure.

In this context Mr. McCone then presented an alternate plan (called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale, which he said had been prepared as a result of the conclusion that stepped-up B would not in fact result in the overthrow of Castro. He emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual use of U.S. military force. Mr. McCone said that a stepped-up B will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary-type blood bath if unsupported. Not only would the U.S. be blamed, but there would also be a high noise level in the press and eventually a situation would be created which would require intervention.

On the other hand, the CIA variant now proposed would, in Mr. McCone's view, avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising. Again he repeated his view that the U.S. might, however, face a stronger Cuba in the future.

6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was emphasized that any actions under this plan must be so designed as to avoid major attribution to the U.S.

7. General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does not wish Guantanamo used as a base for operational activities, as suggested by CIA. He said that the other Chiefs have not yet given an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the Navy, as he himself does. The view is that this base is too important to the U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban pressure to take the chance of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with this view.

8. Mr. Bundy suggested that a hard look be taken at the possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly "disengaged" basis; in other words, should they be given covert financial and material support, with the idea of seeing what they could generate on their own.

9. Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should be placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive.

10. <u>Action to be taken:</u>

CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be ready by Wesnesday, August 15th.

Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale
destroyed 4/9/63. mn.

Attachment - Agenda for Meeting

Tel D

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING

MONGOOSE

* (S)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE
GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE
DON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime,), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC [illegible] DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING

This document contains [illegible] pages.
Copy No.______ of ______ copies. [illegible]

03075

<u>Gen. Harris</u>: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

<u>Mr. Wilson</u>: Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY 6/15/75

14 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.

SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Attachment
Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

EYES ONLY

SECRET

2

SENSITIVE

FILE:

INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN

Date: May 27, 1975 Time: 10:00 a.m.

Place: Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW

Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton

Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America

Submitted by: Gregory F. Treverton

During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign policy work for John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America. After the election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of 1962, becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America, instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late in 1965.

1. Assassinations:

In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of assassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force, held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro," someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant

FILE:

"Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later in the meeting after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reasonable even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown that Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced with Raul or with Che Guevara, both worse than Castro. Somewhat later, Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szulc had with Kennedy in which the President pledged not to kill Castro. Szulc reported that pledge in an article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only buttress his position in Latin America.

During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and 1967.

Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was involved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life. During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominican Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo was about to be assassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the government was surprised when it occurred. Henry Dearborn, the American Consul in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti-Trujillo forces. Prior to the assassination, he had transferred some weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces. Goodwin suspected that

FILE:

the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that sort might have been passed by the Special Group.

Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact, he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field might regard killings of one sort or another as within his mission in supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g. by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in all Washington agencies including the CIA.

2. CIA Activities in Brazil:

Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United States had strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. In the period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart factions: followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved in Brazilian elections for many years and presumably spent a good deal in the 1963 congressional elections.On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How much further Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin did not know.

FILE:

3. CIA Activities in Chile:

The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic forces in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was applied to Chile, and the U.S. switched its support from the conservative Alessandri. Goodwin sat in on meetings of the Special Group only rarely, only if Latin America were the subject of the meeting. As he remembered it, the proposals that came to the Special Group were general statements, policy papers, not descriptions of recipients of support or conduits. In line with the policy, support was given to left democratic political elements. The U.S. certainly provided assistance to the Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know how much. The figure of $20 million, mentioned by Stern, did not seem inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested, however, the assertion that the Chilean election was the most intensely watched election in Washington since the 1948 Italian campaign. From his vantage point in the White House it did not seem so.

4. Changes during the Johnson Administration:

Johnson cared less about Latin America than had Kennedy--Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American policy, although the President did become active in the two crises--Panama and then the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change in United States' policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support

FILE:

for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated" in the Caribbean. The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from the very beginning and so could hardly have "discovered" it after he became President.

5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency:

When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American objectives could be secured through it. Counterinsurgency was something different. A good deal of money was spent training police through AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity. At that point, the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations were considered by the Special Group (counterinsurgency). Latin American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia. Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little difference to the course of events in Latin America. Cuba could not in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla movements that began had little indigenous support.

FILE:

In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that these came out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Goodwin often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on occasion, specific, indicating groups to be supported and the like. Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin America.

6. Goodwin Suggestions:

Goodwin believed it impossible to control the activities of intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to-day operations. What is required is an active Congressional committee, on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active staff. Once the President is permitted both to decide what is a major operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to tell, the game is over. Confidence in men will not do; institutional checks are required.

With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub-director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger, and with Tad Szulc. In response to a question, Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interested in the Bay of Pigs through Cushman. He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of that.

the United States. Several months later, I presume because of that trip and several other contacts I maintain with representatives of the Cuban government at the United Nations and the Organization of American States, because of my personal friendship with a number of people at the White House and Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Donnegan and others, in a conversation with Mr. Goodwin it was suggested that I come and see the Attorney General. I was invited to lunch with Mr. Kennedy at the Justice Department. We discussed in considerable length the situation in Cuba following the invasion, the pros and cons of some different possible actions by the United States government in that context.

At the end of this conversation, the Attorney General asked me whether I would have objections to meeting with his brother the President. I said I would of course be pleased to do so.

The following day I received a call from the White House indicating that the President would like for me to come in at 11:00 o'clock in the morning on that day in November, which I did. And I was received by the President in the company of Mr. Goodwin in the Oval Office for a conversation which lasted, if memory serves, in excess of an hour and a half, in which the President discussed a number of his views on Cuba in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, asked me a number of questions concerning my conversations with Premier Castro, a general review of the

situation in Cuba, you know, what the United States should do, could do, might do in terms of either in a hostile way or in establishing some kind of a dialogue, most relevant of which I suppose was that at one point the President rather unexpectedly turned to me and said what would you say, what would you think, if I decided to authorize the assssination of Premier Castro?

Let me add for the record that the precise wording appears in the Esquire article from the notes taken at the time. I am now paraphrasing from memory. This was a rather --

Mr. Aaron. Let me read this into the record. "We chatted for a while about Cuba, and then Kennedy leaned forward in his rocking chair and hurled a question at me: 'What would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated?'"

Mr. Szulc. I was taken aback and so indicated to the Preside[nt.] To the best of my recollection, I said in the first instance as a practical matter I thought this would not make all that much difference even if he were because I thought that by then the Cuban structure had been established to a sufficient degree where the murder and disappearance of Fidel Castro would not necessarily mean the collapse of the governing system, if this were the purpose of the United States government.

In the second place, it was more important to me, I said to the President, that my personal feeling was that the United States government should not be party to murders and political assassinations at which point the President leaned back and

smiled and said, well I was testing you. I agree with you completely.

And then he went on for a few minutes to make the point how strongly he felt and his brother felt that the United States for moral reasons should never be in a situation of having recourse to assassination in foreign policy. Again, the precise quotes and the precise paraphrase I placed in the article and again I'm paraphrasing from memory now.

And the President added in this context that the reason I have raised it with you, or words to this effect, is because I am under very, very strong or powerful pressure from certain people, whom he did not identify, to authorize an operation resulting in the assassination of Premier Castro. And I think we talked about this for a few more minutes, and I think I repeated the points I made originally and the President said he felt very strongly that same way and the fact he was testing me or trying to see what my response as a reporter or as a citizen would be.

I might add that several days ago Mr. Goodwin and I had the opportunity to discuss this and compare our respective recollections of it, and Mr. Goodwin's recollection is exactly the same as mine. We discussed this at some length, this being last week, and the subject being relevant to the current flow of news and Mr. Goodwin made the point to me, obviously if President Kennedy were planning to authorize the assassination

of Castro, he would not likely be discussing it with you in the full knowledge of a reporter and if Castro were killed or an attempt to kill him would surface you would have the professional duty to rush to your typewriter and report on this conversation, even though it was on a personal basis. And Mr. Goodwin's judgment, and in which I concur, was that presumably the President would not have floated this issue with me, and this is really responsive to my own effort to re-evaluate after the passage of time the President's sincerity in disclaiming any desire to do so.

My impression at the time and today fourteen years later is that the President was sincere and serious in affirming his revulsion to such an idea of assassination.

Mr. Aaron. Let me ask you, when was your conversation with Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Szulc. The most recent one?

Mr. Aaron. Yes, the one you just mentioned.

Mr. Szulc. Last Friday which would have been the 6th of June of this year.

Mr. Aaron. May I read into the record the following paragraph from your article. "Kennedy leaned back in his chair, smiled, and said that he had been testing me because he was under great pressure from advisers in the Intelligence community (whom he did not name) to have Castro killed, but that he himself violently opposed it on the grounds that for

GOODWIN (TRUJILLO)

The papers produced by Mr. Goodwin on 7/16/75 contained some Trujillo-related material. Certain documents were selected from this material and are produced herein under Tabs **S** and **T**. All of the attached Trujillo-related documents have been produced before the Committee, and Mr. Goodwin has been questioned concerning them. They are attached again herein for possible use in connection with questions concerning handwritten notations appearing on the documents.

TAB S. May 13, 1961 Memorandum to Goodwin re CIA Covert Activities in the Dominican Republic

Page 2 of this document contains, on the original ribbon copy, a pencilled-in circle. Goodwin stated on 7/16/75 that this circle was placed on the original copy of the memorandum by him and indicates that the encircled material (a report of the passage of revolvers and carbines) struck Goodwin as both significant and new to him. Further, the word "neutralize" is underscored in pencil on the original copy of the memorandum. Goodwin might be questioned concerning the significance of this underscore.

TAB T. Various drafts, together with the original of the 5/29/61 cable from the State Department to Dearborn are attached herein. Goodwin stated on 7/16/75 that the handwriting on pages numbered 237, 238, 239, and 240 is his handwriting. The handwriting on pages 233, 234, and 235, a subsequent draft of the same proposed cable is not Goodwin's. Goodwin suggested this handwriting may be that of President Kennedy.

SECRET

EYES ONLY

13 May 1961

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic

Attached is the special briefing paper on CIA covert activities directed against the Dominican Republic which was requested by Mr. Richard Goodwin of the White House.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

SECRET
EYES ONLY

PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

I. BACKGROUND

A. On 29 December 1960 the Special Group approved a plan of covert action to support the internal and exiled Dominican dissidents which involved provision for increased propaganda directed against Trujillo, and the financial support of selected exiled groups. Additionally this authority included authorization for CIA to make available to selected exile groups communications and equipment support necessary for them to develop a capability to undertake the infiltration of personnel and equipment into the Dominican Republic. Since none of the exiled groups had an existing underground organization within the area, it was the Special Group's concept that this delivery capability could be eventually used to support the plans and activities of the internal opposition with whom the Agency and the Consulate are currently in contact.

B. On 12 January 1961 the Special Group authorized CIA to make available to Dominican dissidents a limited supply of small arms and other materials on the condition that the internal opposition develop the capability to receive these materials and that the materials be introduced into the Dominican Republic by Dominicans themselves.

II. CURRENT COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS

A. In late January 1961, CIA advised selected internal opposition leaders that we were prepared to make available to them limited supplies of arms, communications, equipment, and sabotage materials which they had repeatedly requested provided they developed a capability to receive

EYES ONLY
SECRET

it via air drops or sea infiltration. To date the internal opposition has not been able to develop this capability, nor have they been able to nominate training candidates for code radio operators or saboteurs. This turn of events is primarily due to the comprehensive nature of Trujillo's security services, the understandable fear that prevails throughout the Republic of being caught or suspected of anti-Trujillo activities, and the fact that the organized internal opposition apparently consists of only a few individuals with no real underground structure. CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo a very limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent requests from the internal opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three (3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed support.

B. CIA has established working relationships with selected exile groups. These relationships have taken into account that President Betancourt of Venezuela has in effect designated former Costa Rican President Jose Figueres as his emissary and representative to work with Dominican exile groups. Through Figueres and with the knowledge of President Betancourt, CIA is providing financial support and technical guidance to the following activities:

(1) The development of a Dominican exile council in San Jose, Costa Rica, composed of representatives of the two older exile organizations,

a representative designated by Betancourt, and chaired by Figueres. The council had its first organizational meeting in San Jose on 12 May 1961. Subject to CIA's review of the council's proposed program and with the concurrence of President Betancourt, CIA has indicated to Betancourt and Figueres that it is prepared to support the council's program in the amount of $15,000 a month. It is Figueres' initial concept that the council will undertake propaganda activities directed against Trujillo, and train selected Dominicans in democratic process, administrative skills, and public administration so as to equip them to assume positions of res- ponsibility in any successor government. Figueres has also proposed that an exile paramilitary force be trained, but CIA has discouraged this activity to date since neither Betancourt nor Figueres have indicated a clear plan for its eventual use. It is CIA's judgment that the exile groups represented on Figueres' council have little if any popular sup- port among the internal dissidents. However one of the chief advantages that can and is being gained by support of the council is the number of credits that this gives to the United States Government in its dealings with Betancourt and Figueres in utilizing them in other operations. Betancourt has been adamant that no action be taken against Castro until Trujillo is disposed of. This support has served to neutralize his attitude on that point since it amounts to a guarantee to Betancourt of the United States's basic attitude toward Trujillo. Likewise it serves to solidify the attitudes of dissident exiled Dominicans so that they are not anti-U.S. and will make them more approachable and amenable to U.S. Government objectives once Trujillo is overthrown. (2) The conduct

of radio propaganda from Ponce, Puerto Rico, which is under the direction of Horacio ORNES, Secretary General of Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD). This radio program is heard in the Dominican Republic as the voice of the ORNES organization.

(3) CIA has refurbished a small yacht belonging to ORNES so as to give it the capability to deliver small quantities of arms or personnel into the Dominican Republic. This potential para-military boat capability has not been utilized to date. It is contemplated that both the ORNES propaganda program and this limited boat capability will be absorbed by the exile council now being formed by Figueres.

C. With the knowledge of President Betancourt, and using his government as the ostensible source of funds, CIA has provided limited financial support to a small group of Dominicans who are developing a para-military capability in Venezuela.

D. CIA has recently re-located Dr. Juan Isidro Jimenez Grullon from Venezuela to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Jimenez, a physician and university professor, is a highly respected Dominican exile and enjoys the confidence of the internal opposition. He is currently working with the Puerto Rican Government in developing a training program within the structure of the Puerto Rican Government. The objective of this program is to provide "on-the-job" training for selected Dominicans in democratic processes and selected administrative skills. Through Jimenez and a small group of recently exiled Dominicans who were active in the internal opposition, CIA is in the process of establishing communication channels to the internal opposition which will supplement those currently in being through

our Station in Ciudad Trujillo.

E. CIA has a continuing program utilizing news media assets throughout the hemisphere in an effort to discredit Trujillo.

III. COVERT ACTIVITIES CIA IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE BUT HAS NOT INITIATED

A. Train selected members of the internal opposition as code radio operators. CIA has the appropriate radio equipment "on-the-shelf" at our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. However, this program has not been initiated due to the internal opposition's failure to provide individuals who are able to undergo the required training outside of the Dominican Republic and willing to run the risk of having the radio equipment in their possession.

B. Train selected members of the opposition in sabotage and underground resistance techniques. Here again the internal opposition has provided no training candidates or developed a capability to receive explosive materials through clandestine channels.

IV. POSSIBLE COVERT ACTIONS WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION

A. CIA has a supply of four (4) calibre 45 sub-machine guns and a small number of grenades which are currently in the direct custody of our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. A secure means of passing these weapons to the internal opposition for their use in personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to remove Trujillo can be developed by the Station.

B. CIA can initiate leaflet drops over the Dominican Republic, in response to past requests from the internal opposition for leaflets exploiting the excesses of the Trujillo regime.

C. While to date the internal opposition has developed no capability to receive arms or sabotage materials by either air or sea delivery, CIA could initiate operations to cache such supplies off the coast of the Dominican Republic for later retrival by the opposition when they develop such a capability.

D. Initiate the training of para-military cadres. CIA has been reluctant to recommend the initiation of such training since current information indicates that any invasion of the Republic unless massively supported by overt action would be impractical.

Note: We were told these messages were blocked by Mr. Goodwin but this is his message instead.

SECRET

mThis document consists of 2 pages
Copy No. ___ of 9 copies; Series

(Drafted 5/24/61)

FOR DEARBORN FROM DEPARTMENT

1. President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subsequent your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest. Hope this will resolve uncertainties reflected ref ___ but your comments and requests for any necessary clarification will be welcomed.

2. Department appreciates valuable work performed by Amb. Farland and yourself and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements. Would hope this could be retained and strengthened but only if at a cost acceptable from standpoint US national interest. If price tag for friendship of dissidents, whose action capabilities and realistic prospects thus far remain unknown quanti places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which US stands or involves risks which in our considered judgment should not be accepted, feel sure you will agree we should stand firm.

3. While fully congaizant unique circumstances within Dominican Republi which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is nonetheless deeply concerne by degree to which covert activities this case have been forced to deviate from normal cover and cut-out safeguards with result USG too openly identifi with what should be clandestine activities.

4. Running through entire dilemma has been conflict between two objec

(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive cre among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;

(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur.

SECRET

228

In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter. For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted opposition leaders at this x time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver copy to them.

5. In May 19 meeting here with Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman sough disabuse them expectation USG acting either through Department or CIA could be party to any political assassination. At same time assured them this government' continuing sympathy for legitimate aspirations Dominican people achieve representive government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens.

6. In response your comment re covert activities program you should be aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made cont... upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectively to disassociate USG.

7. In light foregoing suggest you withhold further action and to ~~xxx~~ extent feasible substantave conversations with dissidents pending receipt documents now to be pouched.

END OF MESSAGE

ARA:FJDevine:jsr 5/24/61

SECRET

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's meeting of the Special Group, I am forwarding you a draft telegram which we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the guidance he will be receiving on the recently approved contingency plans. The text of this draft telegram has been shown to the Agency and agreed to by them. I am also forwarding copies of the exchange with Dearborn leading up to the present draft telegram to him.

I know it will be difficult for the President to find time before he leaves to have a look at this but, in view of the situation in the Dominican Republic, I feel that he should approve it personally so as to be sure that it is consistent with his views as stated in the NSC Record of Actions for May 5.

Chester Bowles

Attachments:

Tab A - Proposed outgoing telegram

Tab B - Previous exchange of telegrams

SECRET

PROPOSED TELEGRAM
to US Consul General in
Ciudad Trujillo

FOR DEARBORN FROM DEPARTMENT

1. President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subsequent your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest. Hope this will resolve uncertainties reflected your telegram of May 21 but your comments and requests for any necessary clarification will be welcomed.

2. Department appreciates valuable work performed by Amb. Farland and yourself and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements. Would hope this could be retained and strengthened but only if at a cost acceptable from standpoint US national interest. If price tag for friendship of dissidents, whose action capabilities and realistic prospects thus far remain unknown quantity, places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which US stands or involves risks which in our considered judgment should not be accepted, feel sure you will agree we should stand firm.

3. While fully cognizant unique circumstances within Dominican Republic which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is nonetheless deeply concerned by degree to which covert activities this case have been forced to deviate from normal cover and cut-out safeguards with result USG too openly identified with what should be clandestine activities.

4. Running through entire dilemma has been conflict between two objectives:

(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;

(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur.

In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter. For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted opposition leaders at this time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver copy to them. If you believe conditions specified in second and third paras Department's telegram of May 17 fulfilled, you may advise trusted opposition leaders that you assume any friendly group seeking to establish authority after overthrow of Trujillo would promptly declare itself provisional government and request armed assistance from OAS, US, Venezuela and perhaps other governments. If reply affirmative, you may advise them orally lines you think such request should take.

5. In May 19 meeting here with Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman sought disabuse them expectation USG acting either through Department or CIA could be party to any political assassination. At same time assured them this government's continuing sympathy for legitimate aspirations Dominican people achieve representative government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens.

6. In response your comment re covert activities program you should be aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made contingent upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectively to disassociate USG.

7. In light foregoing suggest further action and to extent feasible substantive conversations with dissidents be withheld pending receipt documents now to be pouched.

END OF MESSAGE

FOR DEARBORN FROM STATE

1. President has now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here with one major exception: You are not to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican dissident groups.

2. We consider it essential that you continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among dissident groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable. However, we must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. However, there is much you can do to protect U.S. interests within this framework of policy, including most of the measures in which you are now engaged. Specific instructions follow.

3. Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position. In case of ~~assassination or~~ overthrow of Trujillo--whether or not initiated by pro-U.S. group--the pro-U.S. group should promptly make every effort to constitute itself as reasonable and plausible provisional government. It should immediately declare itself such and request assistance from U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and OAS. If advance discussions

show that dissidents are favorable to this procedure discuss the specific content of such a request and procedures for handling it. All possible preparations should be made short of actual formulation in writing of a ~~signed~~ request in advance of the event. Underlying this procedure is the policy that, under no circumstances, can we take the chance of a communist type takeover in the Dominican Republic even if we must intervene without a request. This last possibility should not be discussed with the dissidents.

4. Reference to multilateral action in record of actions means only that further open sanctions will be multilateral; and that in the case of direct intervention it would be preferable for forces to be multilateral. No broader interpretation is justified. All other U.S. actions--whether propaganda or covert activities--will be continued on a bilateral basis.

5. Covert activities are, as you know, very small due to inability of dissidents to develop a method of receiving supplies which will effectively disassociate U.S., and failure to provide candidates for training as radio operators or saboteurs. Our offer to help along these lines--provided they develop capacity and effective cover--remains open. However, you must request

and receive further specific instructions for any specific covert activity. At the present time we are unable to transfer arms to dissidents. Tell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual fact we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of ~~ultimate disclosure of participation in~~ association with assassination attempt. The basic policy is to continue to hold open offer of covert help, while carefully examining and clearing the specific help requested. This is feasible because, in actual fact, the covert help is very slight except for verbal encouragement and exchange of information.

6. We intend to keep up anti-Trujillo propaganda campaign and other external pressures.

7. FYI, in event overthrow of Trujillo military forces will be dispatched immediately to ~~pre-invasion~~ standing positions. On receipt of request from provisional government, and your concurrence, we ~~will go in~~ will be prepared to go in immediately. If no request is received and there appears to be any danger of communist takeover then decision will be made in Washington whether to intervene regardless. This makes it imperative that a request be obtained if at all possible. End FYI.

235

8. Begin conversations immediately with dissidents informing them of U.S. position and the necessity for an immediate request. If they are favorable to this procedure take all possible measures to prepare for the immediate transmittal of such a request short of the actual preparation of a written document for advance transfer to you.

236

TOP SECRET

For Dearborn from State

1. President has now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here with one [illegible] major exception: You are not to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican dissident groups.

2. We consider it essential that you continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among dissident groups. Your work along this line had been ~~[illegible]~~ invaluable. However, we ~~also~~ must not ~~[illegible]~~ permit ~~any~~ danger of disclosing any U.S. association with political assaination ~~or intervention in the Dominican Republic~~. This last principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. However, there is much you can do to protect U.S. interests within this framework of policy; including most of the measures in which you are now engaged. Specific instructions follow:

3. ~~Inform~~ Conitune to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position. In case of assassination or overthrow of Trujillo--whether or not initiated by pro-U.S. group--the group should ~~be [illegible]~~ told to make an immediate request for assistance from U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and the O.A.S. This request will be responded to favorably by the United States. They should declare themselves the provisional government and request help whether or not they actually are able to asume power. If they are favorable to this procedure ~~[illegible]~~

237

TOP SECRET

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

For Dearborn from State

1. President has now approved contingency plans discussed during ...
stay here with one ~~xxxx~~ major exception: You are not to request a pre-signed ...
quest for help from Dominican dissident groups.

2. We consider it essential that you continue to work to strengthen ...
sentiment among dissident groups. Your work along this line had been ~~xxxx~~ ...
However, we ~~also~~ must not ~~xxxxxxxx~~ [permit ~~any~~ danger of disclosing U.S. ...
with political assasination ~~or intervention in the Dominican Republic~~. This ...
principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. However, ...
much you can do to protect U.S. interests within this framework of poli...
most of the measures in which you are now ...

3. ...
ase of ~~assination or~~ overthrow of Trujillo=whether or not
tiated by pro U.S. group--the pro U.S. group should promptly
ke every effort to constitute itself as reasonable and plausible
rovisional government. It should immediately to declare itself
uch and request assistance from U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and OAS. ...
... favorable to this procedure ~~xxxxxxx~~

238

discuss the specific content of such a request and procedures for handling it. All possible preparations should be made short of actual ~~preparation~~ in writing of a ~~signed~~ request in advance of the event. Underlying this procedure is the policy that, under no circumstances, can we take the chance of a communist type takeover in the Dominican Republic even if we must ~~go in~~ intervene without a request. This last possiblity should not be discussed with the dissidents.

4. ~~Multilateral~~ Reference to multilateral action in record of actions means only that further open sanctions will be multilateral, and that in the case of direct intervention it would be preferable for ~~OAS~~ forces to be multilateral. No ~~broader~~ broader interpretation is justified. All other U.S. actions--whether propganda or covert activities--will be continued on a bilateral basis.

5. Covert activities are, as you know, very small due to inability of dissidents to develop a method of receiving supplies which will effectively dissacoitate U.S. and failure to provide candidates for training as radio operators or saboteurs. Our offer to help along these lines--provided they develop capacity and effective cover--remains open. However, ~~xx~~ you must request ~~have~~ further specific instructions for any specific covert activity. At ~~the~~ the present time we are unable to transfer ~~more~~ arms to dissidents. Tell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be ~~under suspicion~~. In actual fact we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose

239

TOP SECRET THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

and expose the United States to great danger of ~~the ultimate~~ disclosure of assassinat

attempt. ~~Thexxxxxxxx~~ The basic policy is to ~~xxxxxx~~ continue to hold open offer

of covert help, whule carefully exiaining and clearing the specific help requested.

This is feasible because, in actual fact, the covert help is very slight except

for verbal ancouragement and information.

6. We intend to keep up anti-Trujillo proaganda campaign and other external

pressures.

7. In event overthrow Trujillo military forces will be dispatched immediately

to ~~pre-invasion~~ positions. On recept of request from ~~self-styled~~ provisional government

and your concurrence, we will go in. If no request is received and there appears to

be ~~xxxxxxxx~~ any danger of communist takeover then decision will be made in

Washington whether to intervene regardless. This makes it imperative that a

request be obtained if at all possible.

8. Begin conversations immediately with dissidents informing them of U.S.

position and the ~~xxxxxx~~ necessity for an immediate request. ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~

~~xxxxxx~~ If they are favorable to this procedure take all possible measures to

prepare for the immeditate transmittal of such a request short of the actual

preparation of a written document ~~by the dissidents~~ for advance transfer to you.

Goodwin

240

ORIG: WH/3/DR&H
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE: 29 MAY 1961 1580

TOP SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

29 MAY 61 20 27z

TO: CIUDAD TRUJILLO (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 1-5

INFO: DCI 6, D/DCI 7, DDP 8, COP 9, ADDP/A 10, C/CA 11, S/C 11-12

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET OUT 60__
__0494

TO TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO CITE DIR 42443

REF: TRUJ 0609 (IN 13990) *

42443

EYES ONLY (?)

FOR CIA/ Officer FROM STATE

1. PRESIDENT HAS NOW APPROVED CONTINGENCY PLANS DISCUSSED DURING YOUR STAY HERE WITH ONE MAJOR EXCEPTION: YOU ARE NOT TO REQUEST A PRE-SIGNED REQUEST FOR HELP FROM DOMINICAN DISSIDENT GROUPS.

2. WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT YOU CONTINUE TO WORK TO STRENGTHEN PRO-U.S. SENTIMENT AMONG DISSIDENT GROUPS. YOUR WORK ALONG THIS LINE HAS BEEN INVALUABLE. HOWEVER, WE MUST NOT RUN RISK OF U.S. ASSOCIATION WITH POLITICAL ASSASSINATION, SINCE U.S. AS MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY CANNOT CONDONE ASSASSINATION. THIS LAST PRINCIPLE IS OVERRIDING AND MUST PREVAIL IN DOUBTFUL SITUATION. HOWEVER, THERE IS MUCH YOU CAN DO TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK OF POLICY, INCLUDING MOST OF THE MEASURES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW ENGAGED. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW.

3. CONTINUE TO INFORM DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION. IN CASE OF OVERTHROW OF TRUJILLO--WHETHER OR NOT INITIATED BY PRO-U.S. GROUP--THE PRO-U.S. GROUP SHOULD PROMPTLY MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CONSTITUTE ITSELF AS REASONABLE AND PLAUSIBLE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. IT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DECLARE ITSELF SUCH AND REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM U.S., VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA AND OAS.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOP SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

OUT 60694

TO TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO CITE DIR 42443

IF ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS SHOW THAT DISSIDENTS ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE, DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF SUCH A REQUEST AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING IT. ALL POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE SHORT OF ACTUAL FORMULATION IN WRITING OF A REQUEST IN ADVANCE OF THE EVENT. UNDERLYING THIS PROCEDURE IS THE POLICY THAT, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, CAN WE TAKE THE CHANCE OF A COMMUNIST TYPE TAKEOVER IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC EVEN IF WE MUST INTERVENE WITHOUT A REQUEST. THIS LAST POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE DISSIDENTS.

4. REFERENCE TO MULTILATERAL ACTION IN RECORD OF ACTIONS MEANS ONLY THAT FURTHER OPEN SANCTIONS WILL BE MULTILATERAL: AND THAT IN THE CASE OF DIRECT INTERVENTION IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR FORCES TO BE MULTILATERAL. NO BROADER INTERPRETATION IS JUSTIFIED. ALL OTHER U.S. ACTIONS--WHETHER PROPAGANDA OR COVERT ACTIVITIES--WILL BE CONTINUED ON A BILATERAL BASIS.

5. COVERT ACTIVITIES ARE, AS YOU KNOW, VERY SMALL DUE TO INABILITY OF DISSIDENTS TO DEVELOP A METHOD OF RECEIVING SUPPLIES WHICH WILL EFFECTIVELY DISASSOCIATE U.S., AND FAILURE TO PROVIDE CANDIDATES FOR TRAINING AS RADIO OPERATORS OR SABOTEURS. OUR OFFER TO HELP ALONG THESE LINES--PROVIDED THEY DEVELOP CAPACITY AND EFFECT COVER--REMAINS OPEN. HOWEVER, YOU MUST REQUEST AND RECEIVE FURTHER SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR ANY SPECIFIC COVERT ACTIVITY. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE ARE UNABLE TO TRANSFER ARMS TO DISSIDENTS. TELL THEM THAT THIS IS BECAUSE OF

(CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 60694

PAGE THREE

TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO CITE DIR 42443

OUR SUSPICION THAT METHOD OF TRANSFER MAY BE UNSAFE. IN ACTUAL FACT WE FEEL THAT THE TRANSFER OF ARMS WOULD SERVE VERY LITTLE PURPOSE AND EXPOSE THE UNITED STATES TO GREAT DANGER OF ASSOCIATION WITH ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. THE BASIC POLICY IS TO CONTINUE TO HOLD OPEN OFFER OF COVERT HELP, WHILE CAREFULLY EXAMINING AND CLEARING THE SPECIFIC HELP REQUESTED. THIS IS FEASIBLE BECAUSE, IN ACTUAL FACT, THE COVERT HELP IS VERY SLIGHT EXCEPT FOR VERBAL ENCOURAGEMENT AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

6. WE INTEND TO KEEP UP ANTI-TRUJILLO PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND OTHER EXTERNAL PRESSURES.

7. FYI, IN EVENT OVERTHROW OF TRUJILLO MILITARY FORCES WILL BE DISPATCHED IMMEDIATELY TO STAND-BY POSITIONS. ON RECEIPT OF REQUEST FROM PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND YOUR CONCURRENCE, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO GO IN IMMEDIATELY. IF NO REQUEST IS RECEIVED AND THERE APPEARS TO BE ANY DANGER OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER THEN DECISION WILL BE MADE IN WASHINGTON WHETHER TO INTERVENE REGARDLESS. THIS MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT A REQUEST BE OBTAINED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. END FYI.

8. BEGIN CONVERSATIONS IMMEDIATELY WITH DISSIDENTS INFORMING THEM OF U.S. POSITION AND THE NECESSITY FOR AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST. IF THEY ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO PREPARE FOR THE IMMEDIATE TRANSMITTAL OF SUCH A REQUEST SHORT OF THE ACTUAL PREPARATION OF A WRITTEN DOCUMENT FOR ADVANCE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DIRECTOR

	DEFERRED
	ROUTINE

OUT 60694

PAGE FOUR

CITE DIR 42443

TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO

TO YOU.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Comment: *Ref was message from CIA/ officer to State in which he asked what guidance and encouragement he could give dissidents, if he could provide dissidents with draft document request U.S./OAS assistance in event TRUJILLO overthrown, and asked clarification of President's statement that any action against TRUJILLO should be multilateral.

'S COMMENT:**DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT. ORGANIZATION.

C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.